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Submitted
20 September 2025
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13 November 2025
Published
31 December 2025
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Abstract

Lattice-based cryptography is encryption that uses lattice issues as the basis of a conjecture of the complexity of the worst-case problem. This complexity is considered hard in the world of classical and quantum providing for a primitives design of lattice-based cryptography algorithms. The NIST held a contest to find the best algorithm to implement. This paper compares three finalists of that contest by analyzing the theoretical basis of the lattice problems they hold, with the security of the worst case of the attack through some algorithms, lattices with underlying problems, construction of cryptographic algorithms, and comparative analysis of three finalists of the lattice schemes of the NIST competition. Comparison includes the safety and robustness of the lattice problem used the cryptographic algorithm that is built and finally there will be an analysis in a computational time context to discuss the efficiency algorithm created. Two advantages and disadvantages of each the algorithm finalist are implemented and also described.

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Post-Quantum Trade-offs Cryptographic Algorithms

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Copyright (c) 2025 Mohammed Hasan Al-Dulaimi, Suha Kamal Al-Dulaimi (Author)

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Mohammed Hasan Al-Dulaimi and Suha Kamal Al-Dulaimi, “A Comparative Study of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms Assessing Security and Performance Trade-offs”, Cybersys. J, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 82–90, Dec. 2025, doi: 10.57238/csj.2025.1016.
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How to Cite

[1]
Mohammed Hasan Al-Dulaimi and Suha Kamal Al-Dulaimi, “A Comparative Study of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms Assessing Security and Performance Trade-offs”, Cybersys. J, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 82–90, Dec. 2025, doi: 10.57238/csj.2025.1016.
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